I am interested in the real effects of disclosure & reporting regulation of financial intermediaries. The goal of my research is to provide analytical and practical insights into the low-yield, low-growth economic environment we live in.
My published work examines the effects of increased disclosure in the financial sector. For example, the main takeaway from Enhancing Loan Quality through Transparency is that securitization can be significantly improved by requiring banks to provide loan-level disclosures of the underlying asset portfolios. Similarly, Banks' Reporting Frequency and Asset Quality explores the increased periodicity of bank disclosures and suggests that more frequently disseminated financial reports limit banks' risk-taking and reduce nonperforming loans. Both papers highlight the disciplining effects of disclosure on lending practices—the backbone of financial stability and economic growth.
My working papers on this topic provide two distinct findings using economically significant, novel, and well-identified settings. First, the benefits of financial transparency spill over to the real sector. Banks that are required to provide disclosures on their loan portfolios raise more capital and lend more to businesses, which then invest more and hire more. Second, when banks are required to share information about borrowers in the economy—as a result of their improved information sets—they make better accounting decisions, which lead to better systemic outcomes.
I am also interested in improving our understanding of the role accounting plays in corporate credit markets. In particular, I have a series of papers on the effects of lenders' incentives on corporate loan originations and renegotiations. These papers and all others are listed on my vita and publicly available on my SSRN page.